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INTRODUCTION
More than most areas of law, property causes impatience.  Most
of us have a sense that property is doing something important, but it
does it in a somewhat mysterious way.  Yes, laypeople have a clear
sense of who owns what, and scholars can more or less expound the
welter of rules that come under the heading of “property.”  But to
many, the fact that much of the time property tells some people that
they can tell other people to keep out seems selfish and rude, and
more or less unrelated to the purposes for which we have property in
the first place.  We, speaking of course on behalf of society, have a
clearer sense of what property is supposed to do than how it is sup-
posed to do it.  Gregory Alexander’s The Social-Obligation Norm in Amer-
ican Property Law shares these strengths and weaknesses.1  Its virtue is
in being very clear about purposes, but its focus on ends ultimately
undermines its account of and justification for its chosen means.
† Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I would like to thank Bob Ellickson and
Carol Rose for their helpful comments.  All errors are directly mine.
1 Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 COR-
NELL L. REV. 745 (2009).
959
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I
FLOURISHING AND ITS OBLIGATIONS
Professor Alexander’s article convincingly argues for an inspiring
moral vision of the interests served by property.  He most basically
argues for the primacy of human flourishing and specifically taps into
the capabilities approach developed by Martha Nussbaum and
Amartya Sen.2  Like Eduardo Pen˜alver’s invocation of virtue ethics in
this issue,3 Alexander’s reliance on human flourishing can be located
in a broad constellation of multivalue theories: there are multiple
types of capabilities (or virtues) that need to be promoted that cannot
be compared or traded off directly against each other in any fully
specifiable way.  It is hard to be against human flourishing, and a con-
cept that is in one form or another central to Aristotle,4 Aquinas,5
Catholic social thought,6 modern virtue ethics,7 some forms of natural
law,8 and the capabilities approach9 must have something going for it,
but one can question the degree of consensus required for implemen-
tation in a legal regime.  In particular, I want to suggest that some of
the approaches that Alexander lumps together as opposed to the so-
cial-obligation approach—usually under the banner of law and eco-
nomics—are not so much incompatible with human flourishing as an
end but instead disagree on the means to get there.
In general terms, one means for promoting human flourishing
that Alexander emphasizes is imposing a set of obligations on owners.
2 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILI-
TIES APPROACH (2000); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985); AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); Alexander, supra note 1, at 762–65; see also THE QUALITY R
OF LIFE (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) (evaluating different standards
and conceptions of quality of life).
3 Eduardo Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).
4 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VIII, ch. 13, § 6 (Terence Irwin trans., Hack-
ett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (n.d.).
5 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I, q. 2, art. 3 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 2d revised ed. 1920) (1265–1273).
6 See, e.g., CAN. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, A PASTORAL LETTER ON THE CHRISTIAN
ECOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE FROM THE SOCIAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION para. 7 (2003), available at
http://www.cccb.ca/site/Files/pastoralenvironment.pdf (“[I]n Catholic social thought,
the common good should be conceived as the sustenance and flourishing of life for all
beings and for future generations.”); Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness:
A Catholic Critique of Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 35, 52 (2005); see also
MICHAEL NOVAK, THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 147–68 (1993) (criti-
quing current versions of Catholic social thought and developing Catholic social ethic in-
cluding an account of human flourishing).
7 See, e.g., ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE
AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (Univ. Notre Dame Press 3d ed. 2007) (1981);
PHILIPPA FOOT, Virtues and Vices, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOS-
OPHY 1, 1 (2002); Pen˜alver, supra note 3, at 864–66. R
8 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); Robert P. George,
Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172 (2008).
9 See sources cited supra note 2. R
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Alexander sees this as one overarching obligation, or obligation
norm, that owners must furnish others the means to flourish if their
property has a sufficient nexus to the need.10  Unfortunately, Alexan-
der does not tell us with much specificity what constitutes such a
nexus.  Instead, he believes that such questions should not be an-
swered in an “up-front and across-the-board” way at all.11  Only when
the needs of specific people (or types of people) come into view can
we evaluate their needs in terms of the nexus required between those
needs and the property in question.  Presumably, the greater and
more dire the need, the more attenuated the connection between
that need and the property we can tolerate.  Thus, even in the doc-
trine of necessity, the individual claiming necessity may do so even if
the owner whose property is being used has not done anything to
cause the necessity.12  In the prototypical situations of a person
trapped on a snowy mountain needing the food in the vacant cabin or
the ship about to be caught in the storm next to an unoccupied dock,
the cabin or dock owner did not cause the blizzard or the storm—or
the hiker’s hunger or the ship’s susceptibility to sink.  Nevertheless,
the proximity and the lack of better alternatives make such emergen-
cies come within the narrow necessity doctrine.13
Alexander would like to see this approach widened considerably,
so that owners of historic buildings are obligated not to destroy impor-
tant aspects of a common culture14 and owners of beaches are obli-
gated to welcome in the public for recreational purposes.15
Flourishing requires aesthetically pleasing old buildings and public
beaches.  What is less clear is why the owners of those buildings and
beaches should provide them at personal expense, rather than the
government funding them by taxing other comparably wealthy citi-
zens.  One candidate for nexus Alexander does rule out: unlike Ha-
noch Dagan, Alexander is not looking for some generalized or even
attenuated version of reciprocity of advantage.16  Under the social-ob-
ligation norm, we need not assure ourselves that the owners of Grand
10 Alexander, supra note 1, at 780, 781–82, 795–96, 798–99, 807–08. R
11 Id. at 751.
12 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 24, at
146–48 (5th ed. 1984); Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 69, 83, 91 (2005).
13 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 24, at 146–47. Necessity also permits individuals R
to engage in routine small-scale invasions like retrieving wandering pet cats and stepping
onto a parcel to avoid an obstruction in a road. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197
cmt. c (1965).
14 Alexander, supra note 1, at 791–92, 794–96. R
15 Id. at 804–07.
16 Id. Part II; Hanoch Dagan, Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99
MICH. L. REV. 134, 136 (2000) (“A takings doctrine attuned to the virtues of social responsi-
bility and equality . . . . should start with a rule of long-term reciprocity of advantage . . . .”);
see also Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1266
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Central Terminal will benefit from increased tourism or share suffi-
ciently from the ambience of New York City before we are comforta-
ble imposing an obligation on them.17  But the unanswered question
from such owners will still be, “Why me?”
Professor Alexander is right that the obligations of ownership
often receive too little attention.18  But he goes further than this.  In
his view, the appearances that social obligations make in American
property law are too sporadic and unsystematic.19  He believes that
property law must instead make constant reference to goals, in partic-
ular the goal of human flourishing.  He believes that the emphasis on
flourishing stands in stark contrast to the conventional law-and-eco-
nomics approach, which forms a convenient foil.20  Law and econom-
ics does have a tendency (but a decreasing one, I would argue) to
adopt a crude, narrowly focused utilitarianism in which individual sit-
uations or specific legal rules are evaluated in wealth-maximizing or
welfare terms.21  And Alexander is right that this highly specific utilita-
rianism is problematic from a moral point of view.  For one thing, the
atomizing of property rights into sticks in the bundle, which is a char-
acteristic tendency of this version of law and economics, does not ac-
cord with lay intuitions about the wrongness of theft.22  Nor is
reciprocity of causation consistent with people’s intuitions about who
has harmed whom.23  But I will argue the focus on wealth or welfare
maximization is less problematic than it may appear so long as we
realize how partial it is in various ways.
I would suggest that the constant reference to ends makes Alex-
ander’s social-obligation theory eerily similar to the kind of law and
economics he decries.  Both Alexander and the narrow version of law
and economics he criticizes deny the “gap” between means and ends
in property.  Law and economics evaluates individual legal rules ac-
cording to whether they serve the overall maximization of wealth or
(2007) (discussing long-term reciprocity); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice,
85 VA. L. REV. 741, 771 (1999) (discussing long-term reciprocity and social responsibility).
17 Alexander, supra note 1, at 793–96. R
18 These include the duty to pay taxes and special assessments, the occasional duty to
pay restitution for benefits conferred by good faith mistaken improvers, duties of lateral
support, duties to control uses that would constitute nuisances, and specific duties to main-
tain adjacent infrastructure such as trimming overhanging trees and shoveling sidewalks.
Landowners and the authors who write for them are aware of these issues. See, e.g., CORA
JORDAN, NEIGHBOR LAW: FENCES, TREES, BOUNDARIES & NOISE (4th ed. 2001) (describing
general duties that landowners are legally obligated to satisfy).
19 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 748. R
20 See id. at 748–51.
21 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1867 (2007).
22 Id. at 1852–60.
23 Id. at 1860–66.
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social welfare.24  This focus has led law and economics to embrace the
bundle-of-rights picture because it conveniently chops up property
questions into bite-sized portions, allowing us to frame the analysis in
terms of who should be able to do what with respect to the thing in
question.  For this atomized, bundle-based view, the name of the game
is the system of carrots and sticks to which the primary actors will re-
spond, rather than the right to a “thing” that is central to traditional
property law (and lay views of property).  Sometimes this system of
incentives takes the form of ex post tweaking of existing property
rights, and sometimes the form of highly particularized mechanisms
to induce ex ante behavior.25  Although Alexander would like to jetti-
son the bundle-of-rights picture of property,26 his focus is likewise use
by use, conflict by conflict.
Alexander rightly sees ownership as involving obligations as well
as rights, but as I will argue, he gives short shrift to the rights aspect of
property.  Alexander correctly criticizes certain utilitarian approaches
associated with law and economics as being too un-attuned to moral
questions.  He laments that social obligation appears only implicitly in
property law and that there is a “gap” between property law and
human flourishing.  I will argue, however, that far from being
problems, this implicitness and gappiness is the strength of a property
law that promotes flourishing.
II
HOW PROPERTY FILLS THE GAP
Property is an area of law that has gappiness at its core.  Exclusion
rights serve interests in use only indirectly, but there is a reason for
this.  Constant reference to these interests would undermine prop-
erty’s advantages of solving problems wholesale and coordinating the
activities of often-anonymous actors.  These advantages, to which I re-
turn below, are easy to overlook, and Alexander is by no means alone
in leaving them out of the picture.  Much of the kind of law and eco-
nomics Alexander takes as his foil likewise treats property as a branch
of contract or tort, with no special character as a right to a thing that
is good against the world.
What such approaches share with Alexander’s view is a lack of
appreciation for the virtue of deciding many questions up front and
across the board.  Why is the interaction between polluter and resi-
dent asymmetrical in the sense that the default package of rights gives
a resident the right to be free from pollution but polluters need an
24 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 748–49. R
25 See id. at 750–51.
26 Id. at 800–01.
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easement to have the “right to pollute”?27  Because the default pack-
age is lumpy, it sweeps in all sorts of as-yet-unspecified uses and poten-
tial interactions and declares the owner the winner—the gatekeeper
who can decide who gets to do what.  This economizes on information
costs for duty holders and officials.28  But exclusion is a means to an
end and not an end in itself, and is far from absolute even as a means.
No one except a fetishist would believe that exclusion is a positive
good, but the right to exclude indirectly serves a wide—and, crucially,
only vaguely specified—set of interests.29  Because the owner has the
right to exclude, the owner usually can use the property for a variety
of uses without answering to outsiders.  The owner of land can live
there, read a book, park his car, and grow crops, etc., without consult-
ing with anyone else.  These interests are why we want to have prop-
erty—and they do promote human flourishing—but the whole point
of the basic exclusion mechanism is to avoid having to delineate rights
directly in terms of these interests.
But the right to exclude is not the end of the story and does not
always have the last word.30  When an issue is important enough and
bargains will not or should not happen, then owners’ rights must give
way to larger social interests.  This has happened in such varied con-
texts as airplane overflights,31 necessity,32 and antidiscrimination.33
The resulting pattern is that property’s core is a right to things
against the world, which is a rough first cut at dealing with a wide,
indefinite, and open-ended set of problems by delegating decisions
over the use of property to owners who have better information about
it.  But the presumption in favor of this delegation is rebuttable.
Where problems are important enough and cannot be solved better
in a different way, we start to use more tailored solutions—govern-
ance—that make more direct reference to the ends that we collec-
27 See Smith, supra note 12, at 70–76. R
28 See id. at 78–79.
29 See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 30–32 (1996) (analyzing property as an
“open ended set of use-privileges” protected by “trespassory rules”); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA
OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68–74 (1997); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strate-
gies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S469 (2002); Smith, supra note 12, R
at 76–80.
30 But cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731
(1998) (attempting to reduce much of property to elaborations of the right to exclude).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260 (1942) (discussing how high-
altitude flights do not violate landowners’ rights under ad coelum doctrine); Hinman v. Pac.
Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1936) (affirming dismissal of landowner’s claims
against airlines in connection with overflights); see also THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E.
SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 9–15 (2007) (discussing law of airplane
overflights).
32 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908); Smith, supra note 12, at 82–83; R
see also MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 31, at 439–42 (discussing law of necessity in property). R
33 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2000); see also MERRILL &
SMITH, supra note 31, at 456–80 (discussing antidiscrimination law in property). R
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tively want to see served.34  Much argument over property rights
revolves around how easily and for what purposes society should over-
ride this presumptive delegation to the gatekeeper owner.35  But re-
gardless of how these questions are answered, the overall structure
could be regarded as constructed of a core and periphery—a reality
that seems to offend the sensibilities of Alexander and others who
would like to see the end of flourishing more in direct view.36  Or
perhaps these scholars believe that every application of a rule or stan-
dard expresses an entire world view of individualism or altruism,37 but
sometimes the practicalities dominate—the idea of using ex post stan-
dards all the time, as Alexander can be read as advocating, would
seem to raise information costs to the breaking point.  In my view, it is
only because the basic exclusionary regime is taken for granted that
this core-and-periphery architecture is seen to signal the lack of im-
portance of the interests that come through at the “periphery.”  On
the contrary, these interests’ importance enables them to come
though the heavy gravitational pull of the exclusionary regime gener-
ally used to solve the basic need for stability and coordination.
Like many looking for a culprit for the law’s lack of attention to
social obligation, Professor Alexander thinks he has found one in law
and economics.38  Specifically, Alexander has in mind the particular
strain of law and economics that focuses on any quantity measurable
on a single scale such as wealth maximization or social welfare.  He
further implies that the single-minded pursuit of a scalar value, even if
it reflects multiple considerations, elevates markets over community
and causes too much deference to owners in pursuit of market
values.39
Although law and economics can become myopic, its myopia
does not necessarily lead to deference to owners.  If wealth maximiza-
tion were the goal, a social planner with good information about
wealth would be able to set “prices” or make allocative decisions di-
rectly.  The issue of whether the government or owners should decide
34 See Smith, supra note 29, at S454–55 (comparing exclusion and governance). R
35 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965, 1040–45 (2004).
36 Alexander, supra note 1, at 741–48; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private R
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1737 (1976) (describing classical legal theory as
concerned with identifying “core” individual legal freedoms and a “periphery” of limita-
tions on those freedoms, and modern legal theory as dissolving the distinction between
core and periphery).
37 Kennedy, supra note 36, at 1685 (arguing that, in the private law context, individu- R
alists favor rules and altruists favor standards).
38 See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 225–40, 265–66 (1993) (arguing that law and economics and prudentialism
are in conflict).
39 Alexander, supra note 1, at 750–51. R
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how to maximize the utility of property is reminiscent of the socialist
calculation debate about whether a central planner could overcome
the information problems inherent in allocating resources in an econ-
omy without market prices.40  In private-law theory, in fact a mini-ver-
sion of the socialist calculation debate is occurring now with would-be
planners devising ever more complicated and sophisticated liability
rules that allow officially-determined liability to substitute for the
prices that owners protected by property rules (embodied in injunc-
tions and punitive damages) would set on their own.41  Or liability-
rule schemes are devised to induce owners to cough up their informa-
tion so that we may put it to better collective use.42  Neither approach
is particularly deferential to owners, but an emphasis on increasing
the use of liability rules is well within the mainstream of economic
analysis.
Instead, it is the new institutionalists,43 Austrians,44 assorted liber-
tarians,45 and Burkeans willing to use economic analysis as a tool46
who argue for more delegation to owners and stronger property-rule
protection.  They are joined by many non–law and economics schools
of thought that have often defended the merits of property rules.
40 Compare H.D. DICKINSON, ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISM (1939), and Oskar Lange, On the
Economic Theory of Socialism (1936–37), reprinted in ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM
57 (Benjamin E. Lippincott ed., 1938) (describing methods for implementing a successful
socialist economy), with LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 137–42 (J. Kahane trans., Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 1951) (1922), and F.A. v.
Hayek, Socialist Calculation: The Competitive ‘Solution’, 7 ECONOMICA 125 (1940) [hereinafter
Hayek, Socialist Calculation], and F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 529 n.1 (1945) [hereinafter Hayek, Knowledge]. See generally DON LAVOIE, RIVALRY
AND CENTRAL PLANNING: THE SOCIALIST CALCULATION DEBATE RECONSIDERED (1985) (sum-
marizing major arguments about the viability of a centrally planned economy); Robert
Heilbroner, Analysis and Vision in the History of Monetary Economic Thought, 28 J. ECON. LITER-
ATURE 1097, 1097–98 (1990) (acknowledging that capitalism ultimately won in the real
world but that “the successes of the farsighted seem accounted for more by their prescient
‘visions’ than by their superior analyses”).
41 This is cheerfully admitted in Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and
Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1, 51–54 (2001).
42 See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005);
Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 41, at 76; Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 R
CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854–56 (1993).
43 See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1727 (2004)
(arguing for information cost advantages of property rules).
44 See, e.g., Hayek, Socialist Calculation, supra note 40; Hayek, Knowledge, supra note 40; R
see also Christopher T. Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics, 54 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 507 (1986) (using approach of the Austrian School—which holds that markets
are necessary to overcome imperfect information in order to set prices—to analyze con-
tract law).
45 Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2103–05 (1997) (arguing that a rule allowing courts to require a prop-
erty owner to pay to enjoin a nuisance results in a “massive destabilization of property
rights”).
46 Smith, supra note 43, at 1723–24. R
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Feminist scholars have been at the forefront in questioning the in-
creasing hegemony of the often paired liability-rule paradigm and
bundle-of-rights picture of property.47  A heavy emphasis on protect-
ing exclusion rights even in the absence of demonstrated harm (the
classic trespass paradigm) has also been defended in Kantian terms.48
Indeed, although examining it would take us too far afield, I would
expect that the basic architecture of property law—a core consisting
of exclusion rights with no-questions-asked liability and a periphery
consisting of increasing numbers of governance rules subject to ongo-
ing revision—is characteristic of a range of consequentialist, deonto-
logical, and eudaimonistic theories that take seriously basic problems
of implementation such as information and complexity.49
Thus mainstream law and economics sometimes has a narrower
view of the purpose of property and other legal institutions, but it, like
Alexander, is single-minded in its focus on those ends.  As a result,
both mainstream law and economics and Alexander tend to elide the
costs of setting up the mechanism—the means to those ends—one
way rather than another way.  Everyone, it seems, is looking for the
“right” answer on one side—the benefit or purpose side—of the
ledger (if that is the right metaphor), while overlooking information
costs.  Theories that keep ends in constant collective view tend to find
the owner’s gatekeeping dispensable, possibly even altogether unnec-
essary.  Again, Alexander disclaims any ex ante across-the-board deci-
sion making.  But this is the very purpose of the (presumptive)
exclusion regime.  This is what makes property not only a right in the
first place but a special one in that it sweeps in a large and indefinite
class of interests.  It permits owners to determine a large swath of in-
terests their property will serve.  We reserve collective determinations
of the right answer for issues where we think that we are collectively
more likely to find the right answer and where finding that right an-
swer is important enough to override a property owner’s presumptive
rights.
Alexander accuses others, especially in law and economics, of
“begging the question,” with a futile focus on harms and benefits.50
But we need to know the right question before we can be said to be
47 See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three’s a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and
Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 412–17 (1999) (providing
feminist critique of view that liability rules and property rules are alternate methods of
protecting same entitlement).
48 See Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 216 n.1, 218
(2006).
49 As Eric Claeys points out, eudaimonistic theories belong to a cross-cutting category,
and a eudaimonistic approach can dovetail with a core of exclusion in property. See Eric R.
Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 909 (2009).
50 Alexander, supra note 1, at 798–800. R
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begging it.  Alexander is right that a freefloating inquiry into harms
and benefits doesn’t get us very far.51  And he is quite right that the
bundle-of-rights metaphor isn’t all that helpful (he would abandon it
altogether, although I think it has limited usefulness).52  But his ques-
tion about what obligations we owe society isn’t the right—or rather is
a right but not the right or only—question either.  The traditional, and
I think the correct, question is whether a problem is too large and too
hard to solve any other way such that the presumption in favor of
property’s core right to exclude has to give way to some kind of collec-
tive regulation, as is the case for airplane overflights, necessity, and
antidiscrimination, among other areas.  Alexander’s theory, like much
law-and-economics scholarship, exhibits a lack of respect for the ro-
bustness of the core of an owner’s property right, which is best re-
garded not as absolute but as carrying heavy presumptive force.  How
much presumptive force that should be is a worthy topic for debate,
but zero presumption is unrealistic and would be a practical
nightmare.53
Professor Alexander assumes that collectively we have to be able
to get every compromise between aspects of human flourishing cor-
rect, and that if we cannot make an appropriate ex ante decision, we
must reserve decisions until they can be made ex post.  This ignores the
benefits of simple ex ante baselines.  It also shares with the bundle-of-
rights theory and welfarism an issue-by-issue focus on getting the
“right” answer to use conflicts as if such conflicts posed one long test,
instead of a complex interaction in which no one decision maker can
possess or act on all the relevant information.54
It is because the world of interactions is so complex that modular
solutions must be on the table.55  Property, particularly in its core
right to exclude, allows a lot of what goes on internal to the property
to be of concern only to the owner.  If I see a car parked in a parking
lot, I know not to take it whether it is owned by a person or a corpora-
tion, whether the owner is virtuous or not, and whether the car is on
loan from the owner to someone else.56  If I don’t own Blackacre,
most of the time I know to keep off regardless of what the owner’s
uses and plans are for the land.  Where all this keeping off is not
51 Id. at 754, 798–99.
52 Id. at 800–01.
53 Perhaps some—emphatically not Professor Alexander—might argue that the cur-
rent presumption is too strong but one could strategically deny it entirely in an attempt to
weaken it.  But this argument comes perilously close to the “noble lie,” which really has no
place in an academic discussion, or in my view, in any kind of rational discussion at all.
54 Hayek, Knowledge, supra note 40, at 519–20. R
55 Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information,
116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1751 (2007).
56 PENNER, supra note 29, at 75–76.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-4\CRN408.txt unknown Seq: 11  6-MAY-09 14:33
2009] MIND THE GAP 969
enough, governance rules form the interface between one owner and
another and can be supplied by contract or by the law off the rack.57
We as outsiders find it hard to evaluate what owners do and why, but
we know that on average owners are good at choosing uses over a
large range, so it makes sense to make ownership a black box for some
purposes and reserve micro-managing the “interdependencies” to a
defined interface.58  Moreover, the need for the system to evolve may
require modularization, and it is tricky to know to what extent
remodularization should be delegated to owners or undertaken col-
lectively.  Property law provides the overall structure to manage the
complexity that Alexander rightly emphasizes, but the need to man-
age complexity points to the need, at least in theory, for a modular
solution.  If so, his considerations lead in practice exactly away from
his skepticism toward delegation to owners.  Ultimately, what degree
and kind of modularization we need is an empirical question.
To subscribe to this view is not to elevate the market over every-
thing else.  Property rules and deference to owners will generally pro-
mote markets sometimes, but sometimes they won’t.  Living without
some seemingly wealth-promoting transactions is the price we pay for
living in a stable and humane society that manages complexity
through decentralization to property owners.  Within law and eco-
nomics, fans of liability rules and eminent domain, especially for eco-
nomic development takings,59 seem to forget that the optimal amount
of successful holding out is probably not zero once we take into ac-
count the costs of institutional responses to holdouts.  Sometimes we
will have to let worthy projects be stopped by holdouts, and part of the
reality of transaction costs is that some imperfections from holdouts
must remain; markets and their liability-rule substitutes cannot
achieve the benchmark zero-transaction-cost-world result.60  Markets
may play an essential role in that decentralization but they are not the
be all and end all of property’s delegation to owners.  In a sense, only
owners ultimately know.
Why do Alexander and mainstream law and economics downplay
the virtues of ex ante (rebuttable) presumptive rights of property own-
ers?  They are easy to overlook.  First, the indirectness of the relation-
ship between exclusion and the interest it serves makes the
connection easy to ignore.  Second, the analytical spirit finds it conge-
nial to focus on individual rules and justify them or criticize them on
57 Smith, supra note 55, at 1764–66. R
58 Id. at 1748, 1765.
59 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485 (2005) (holding that economic
development can satisfy the public-use requirement for eminent domain under the Tak-
ings Clause).
60 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–16 (1960); Deirdre Mc-
Closkey, The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 E. ECON. J. 367, 370 (1998).
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whatever grounds we accept as their purposes.  But I am arguing that
property’s benefits not just of stability and incentive-giving but also of
coordination in a complex world are emergent properties of the en-
tire property system.  If so, it is fallacious to expect any given decision
or rule or feature of the property system to partake of the desirable
feature of the whole.  To expect every application of property law or
every owner’s exercise of her rights to pass some societal test—
whether it be wealth maximization or flourishing of the community’s
members—is to commit the fallacy of division, of inferring that parts
of a whole share the properties of the whole.61  Water molecules are
not “wet” but a body of water is; property may promote human flour-
ishing even if not every rule or decision on the part of courts or par-
ties, such as an invocation of trespass, directly (or best) promotes
human flourishing.  Moreover, as emergent properties, stability and
coordination cannot be simply added as a balancing factor to the ex
post mix, as Alexander believes.62  Third, talking about ultimate ends is
more glamorous than asking the more engineering-like question of
how to serve them.  But if there is anything legal scholars do better
than economists, social scientists, and philosophers, it is institutional
design.  (And it is easy to be cynical and say that any concession to
practicality is a cloak for ulterior motives, but again I take this as an
argument to diminish the presumption for owner delegation rather
than to abolish it.)  We should embrace our role.
Finally, the aspects of property I am emphasizing can be regarded
as yesterday’s news.  The lack of deference to owners is most apparent
in societies that have not solved the basic problem of social order or
have a pathological type of hyper-order (think North Korea).63  The
more refined problems that consume most of the attention of law
schools, law firms, markets, and even courts are at the apex of a pyra-
mid with more basic property features like rights to exclude at their
base.64  Most of the time this is a good allocation of our time: the
marginal benefit—whether measured on one scale or more pluralisti-
61 STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING 171–72 (2d ed. 1984).
62 The idea that an analysis “takes account” of a value as long as it is one of the factors
thrown into the balancing exercise rests on a lot dubious assumptions.  For one thing, an
emergent property of a system may not be subject to control by introducing a “factor” with
that label.  Thus, the idea that one can promote stability and coordination by introducing a
factor “corresponding” to them may not be possible.  Furthermore, the balancing that Al-
exander envisions partakes of the idea that more information is always better, but this can
fail to be true, especially in complex systems. See, e.g., 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B.
CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY 5 (2000); GERD GIGERENZER, RATIONAL-
ITY FOR MORTALS: HOW PEOPLE COPE WITH UNCERTAINTY 6 (2008); Ronald A. Heiner, The
Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 565–67 (1983).
63 See Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empiri-
cal Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1369 (2001).
64 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Econom-
ics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 397–98 (2001).
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cally—from focusing on these challenging problems is greater than
rehearsing the point of the basic property regime.  It is natural to be-
lieve that what we think about is all there is.  But when we forget the
virtues of the basic setup it becomes valuable to explore them anew.
III
CORE AND PERIPHERY IN PROPERTY LAW
Part of the problem for those like Alexander, who have particular
ends constantly in view for property law, is that those ends appear only
sporadically, and worse, those appearances are limited to the “periph-
ery” of property law.  But referring constantly to ultimate ends is costly
and is reserved for high-stakes situations where other mechanisms do
not work so well.  This is not a measure of the unimportance of these
“exceptions” at the “periphery” but reflects their importance—we are
willing to accommodate them in what is otherwise a very robust insti-
tution that prevents social chaos and allows for a widespread basic
coordination.
A. The Morality of Property
Those, including Alexander, who would like to see property re-
spond more to social obligation, from the Realists onward, often in-
voke the traditional maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use what
is yours in such a way as not to injure that of others).65  This was the
touchstone of nuisance law, but although it gives us assurance that the
social-obligation idea is not altogether new, property law reflects a
structure of morality that not coincidentally reflects the core of exclu-
sion and the refinements in terms of governance.66
At its core, property draws on an everyday morality that it is
wrong to steal and violate others’ exclusion rights.  Because property
requires coordination between large numbers of anonymous and far-
flung people, there are good information-cost reasons for relying on
simple lay moral intuitions when it comes to the basic setup of prop-
erty.  This does not mean that information costs are the only reasons
for setting things up this way, but an information-cost theory is com-
patible with a large range of moral theories other than a narrow case-
by-case utilitarianism that disregards this basic problem of informa-
tion and morality.67  Thus, use balancing is reserved for situations of
high stakes in which other solutions (like contracts) are not likely to
work.68  And it is in these contexts that property shifts to balancing
and sic utere—an alternative moral vision that is appropriate to this
65 Alexander, supra note 1, at 746–47. R
66 Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 1890–91; Smith, supra note 35, at 1004–07. R
67 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 1856–57. R
68 See Smith, supra note 35, at 980–82, 995–96. R
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more personal context.  An economic account like this does not re-
quire a philosophical commitment to one overriding value.  Interest-
ingly, despite its rejection of single-scalar theories of value,
Alexander’s theory’s constant reference to ends resembles case-by-
case utilitarianism’s approach to the basic architecture of property.
This architecture still leaves us with the core-and-periphery pat-
tern that is offensive to Alexander.  Like Duncan Kennedy, whose im-
agery he invokes here, Professor Alexander seems to believe that
property law relies too heavily on rules and formalism and is therefore
too excessively individualist as opposed to standards that would allow
the law to reflect altruism (or social obligation).69  Assuming for the
sake of argument that the law should reflect social obligation more, it
should be easier to override the advantages of exclusion rights (in
terms of their own morality and information costs) in some areas than
in others.  This is likely to begin with areas like nuisance and the ex-
isting necessity doctrine, i.e., at the periphery.  As we take these kinds
of problems more seriously, or diminish the importance of the basic
exclusionary setup, the “periphery” expands at the expense of the
core.  Only if other considerations dominate the core problems of so-
cial order, coordination, and stability—considerations served by sim-
ple rules of exclusion—should the need for those basic rules
disappear.  Even then, it is an open question whether to devise more
governance rules or to substitute toward more fine-grained private
parcels instead.70  Ultimately, these are empirical questions.  Identify-
ing exclusion with individualism and selfishness (which the repeated
reference to the narrowest versions of the rational actor paradigm
may be designed to suggest) is merely an exercise in name calling.  In
other words, even if one accepts a particular vision of human flourish-
ing as the goal for property law—or social institutions more gener-
ally—one still has to work out how all these considerations come
together, and importantly whether we should make some of those de-
cisions up front and across the board in terms of presumptive rights of
exclusion.
69 See Kennedy, supra note 36, at 1685. R
70 See Smith, supra note 29, at S475–77.  Examples include enclosure, which may have R
increased output but sometimes at the expense of those with informal rights. See, e.g.,
THRA´INN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS § 7.4.1, at 221–23 (1990);
E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON 97–184 (1991); J.A. YELLING, COMMON FIELD AND
ENCLOSURE IN ENGLAND: 1450–1850, at 1–10 (1977); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land,
102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1391–92 (1993); Donald N. McCloskey, The Economics of Enclosure: A
Market Analysis, in EUROPEAN PEASANTS AND THEIR MARKETS: ESSAYS IN AGRARIAN ECONOMIC
HISTORY 123, 142–51 (William N. Parker & Eric L. Jones eds., 1975).  Recently, tradable
permits represent a fine-grained parcelization in response to large scale problems. See, e.g.,
Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,
1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–36.
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At this point one common answer might be that the redistribu-
tion Alexander would like to see in property law is better achieved
through the tax and transfer system.  A lively debate has been joined
over whether using substantive legal rules for redistribution is more
distortionary than similar levels of redistribution in the tax and trans-
fer system.71  But I’d like to suggest that information costs and the
problem of complexity are reasons we have different areas of law, and
that, despite decades of legal realism and post-realist skepticism, areas
of law do retain their distinct identities.  Perhaps law itself has a modu-
lar structure and it manages complexity by allowing some areas to spe-
cialize in some problems without constant reference to what is going
on elsewhere.  From this point of view, it is an open question whether
the amount of redistribution we’d collectively like would be best han-
dled in some modules than others, or more globally as a feature of all
parts of the system.
Perhaps the main lesson from law and economics is that ideal
benchmarks are not the whole story, but any proposed alternative
must be evaluated against the other plausible contenders.72  This is
not to argue that the mechanism of property is merely a plumbing
problem unrelated to moral considerations.  Far from it.  Morality is
quite related to the mechanism, but it too points to core and periph-
ery.  Property, as it comes down to us in tradition, is a collective good
that promotes human flourishing, and we need to be a little more
careful than legal scholars are inclined to be when we suggest over-
turning the basic architecture of that system.  For this reason, pure
solutions (“corner solutions” to economists) offered by low-level utili-
71 Compare Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 993–94, 1126 (2001) (claiming that legal rules do little to affect income distributions,
and that income tax and transfer programs more effectively redistribute resources), and
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal
Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 821–22 (2000)
(maintaining that legal rules should not be adjusted to redistribute in favor of the poor),
and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (arguing that legal rules generally
achieve redistributional goals less efficiently than income taxes), with Ronen Avraham et
al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to
Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2004) (arguing against Kaplow and Shavell’s
assumptions that social planners have complete information and claiming that populations
are homogenous with respect to capacity to earn income and avoid injury), and Chris Wil-
liam Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003,
1008–10 (2001) (responding to specific criticisms of the use of legal rules to redistribute
resources), and Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A
More Equitable Approach, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 798 (2000) (asserting that legal rules can be
modified to serve redistributional goals).
72 This is sometimes termed avoidance of the “nirvana” fallacy, see Harold Demsetz,
Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–4 (1969), and is related to
the theory of the second best, see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of
Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11–12 (1956).
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tarianism and an exclusive focus on social obligations—though they
disagree on the nature of the goals property should promote—are
missing something in their focus on goals alone.  Put another way,
when architectural considerations are evaluated, utilitarians should be
forced to higher levels and more general rules.  Likewise, I would ar-
gue that the architecture of a property law like ours is not only consis-
tent with a system that promotes human flourishing, but that the core
and periphery of property law work together as an important “infra-
structure” to promote human flourishing.73  Crucially, however, it
does so by making some decisions up front and across the board.
Whether decisions are made up front and owners are given some
deference is quite separate from whether one accepts utilitarianism,
and I have suggested that narrow utilitarianism tends to counsel in
favor of overriding owners’ wishes.  The crude utilitarianism Alexan-
der sees in law and economics still bothers him.  But what really is the
role of utilitarian-speak in economics, and law and economics in par-
ticular?  Undoubtedly, one can find convinced utilitarians and conse-
quentialists, but I suspect for many, including myself, utilitarianism is
a method of communication more than anything else.  Law, like com-
munication generally, is subject to a tradeoff between communicating
intensively with close-knit audiences with common knowledge and
with extensive audiences in a more stripped down and formal way.74
This helps explain why property, particularly in its core, is more for-
mal than more personalized contract interpretation where context is
more welcome.75  This communicative trade-off applies to theorizing
about the law as well.  Utilitarian-speak is formal; it leaves a lot of con-
text and texture out—and this is a real loss—but it makes communica-
tion easier.  Yes, something is lost in translation but as long as we
know what we’re doing—that it is a simplification good for some pur-
poses and not others—it is not so problematic.76  One can talk like a
utilitarian without being one.  The morality of property does not de-
pend on it either.
73 Alexander, supra note 1, at 776 (claiming that material infrastructure is required R
for human flourishing).
74 See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1110–11 (2003).
75 See id.
76 Many have argued that cost-benefit analysis is only partial, see, e.g., MATTHEW A.
ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 25 (2006); see also
Pen˜alver, supra note 3, at 853–56 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis tends to discount R
nonmarket goods and the interests of future generations), but the argument here is a little
different.  To facilitate communication, the language of cost-benefit analysis can be used
cautiously even where we do not believe that it captures the underlying values.
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B. False Dichotomies in Property Mechanisms
Professor Alexander is certainly not alone in arguing for a vision,
pluralistic as it is in terms of ends, that leads to an all-or-nothing ap-
proach in terms of the means to get there.  If any goal is overriding
enough, the means are secondary.  Sometimes the principal dichot-
omy in means is characterized as rules versus standards, or formalism
versus contextualism.  I have argued elsewhere against corner solu-
tions when it comes to formalism and contextualism.77  Formalism is
most usefully understood as invariance to context.78  Thus the lan-
guage of mathematics is more formal than English because less use of
context is needed for interpretation.  No useful system employs no
context or makes maximal use of context (whatever that would be);
rather, systems fall on a spectrum.  Communication is subject to a
trade-off in which, at equal cost, one can communicate in an informa-
tion-packed, intense way with a small audience that has the relevant
background knowledge, or one can communicate in a more stripped-
down way with an extensive audience.79  This trade-off occurs in law,
in which context is more relevant to the interpretation of contracts
than of deeds, and in natural language, in which speakers will use less
context-dependent language when there is greater social distance be-
tween themselves and their audience.  The result is that we get formal-
ism along a sliding scale, in what I have called “differential”
formalism.80
In a previous article, I have noted how the realists and their suc-
cessors regard the question of formalism in law as an all-or-nothing
proposition.81  The realists tended to argue that if one had to use con-
text in interpreting a contract some of the time then maximal use of
contracting context was desirable all the time.82  This is fallacious.
But law and economics is an heir to legal realism in many respects,83
and this one is not so different.  Some law-and-economics scholars
come close to arguing that the virtues of certainty and simplicity domi-
nate almost across the board, at least for commercially sophisticated
parties.84  (Although there may, as I will argue, be more than timing
77 Smith, supra note 74, at 1113. R
78 Id.; see also Francis Heylighen, Advantages and Limitations of Formal Expression, 4
FOUNDS. SCI. 25, 27, 49–53 (1999) (defining formalism in language).
79 Smith, supra note 74, at 1110–11. R
80 Id. at 1157, 1167–90.
81 Id. at 1177–90.
82 See id. at 1180–81.
83 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 64, at 366. R
84 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 562 (2003); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz &
Scott, Political Economy] (arguing that bright-line rules are more likely to benefit interest
groups, but that academically oriented reformers prefer such standards). See generally Jason
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and discretion separating formal and contextual decisionmaking, the
law-and-economics analysis of rules and standards in terms if timing—
ex ante rules versus ex post standards—does leave open some room for
standards.)85  Overall, as Robert Cooter points out, economists tend
to view the problem of legal deterrence in terms of prices: liability is a
cost to impose on actors to give them the correct ex ante incentives for
activities.86  After declaring that the “economic perspective is blind to
the distinctively normative aspect of law,”87 Professor Cooter notes in
particular that economists tend to downplay sanctions, which impose
discontinuous liability for what is forbidden, and view them as a kind
of price.88  Law is a complex mixture of prices and sanctions, and
neither dominates the other.  The choice turns in part, as Cooter
notes, on whether officials have better information on external harm
so that it can be priced or on the correct standard of behavior so that
it can simply be backed up with a sanction.89  Life is not so homogene-
ous as to call for all of one and none of the other.
Alexander’s flourishing approach shares with much of conven-
tional law and economics an all-or-nothing approach.  Because both
are more focused on end goals and how to measure them and not on
the mechanism used to achieve those ends, they both tend to assume
that the mechanism is a homogeneous whole.  I have already men-
tioned the tendency, which flirts with the fallacy of division, to assume
that proper parts of the mechanism must share the desirable proper-
ties we should be looking for in the whole of property—or the whole
of our social institutions—like efficiency, flourishing, virtue-promo-
tion, or justice.90  Ends-focused theories tend to overlook the richness
of the mechanism by which ends are achieved.
In property, exclusion and governance each have their place, giv-
ing rise to the familiar core-and-periphery pattern.  Exclusion and
governance are related to rules versus standards, property rules versus
liability rules, sanctions versus prices, and stability versus flexibility.
These partially overlapping dichotomies are all a matter of degree and
it would be astounding if in a chunk of our social institutions as large
as property law, one or the other should dominate the other com-
Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 341 (1991) (discussing and evaluating a range of law-and-economics argu-
ments for greater use of rules).
85 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 568–88
(1992) (analyzing rules versus standards in terms of timing of decision making).
86 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524–25 (1984).
87 Id. at 1523.
88 Id.  Conversely, he notes that the jurisprudential perspective tends to ignore the
power of law in the form of prices to give efficient incentives without the need for official
control.  Id.
89 Id. at 1532–37.
90 See discussion supra p. 969–70.
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pletely.  The law is characterized by many such dichotomies, and while
it is an empirical question how to resolve the dilemma, a best initial
guess is that a corner solution—all of one and none of the other—is
unlikely to be best for any of them.  The big problem with Alexander’s
approach is not the interests in view but in the rejection of determin-
ing proximity between an owner’s property and the goal of flourishing
up front and across the board.  This is a corner solution for standards,
and, although it is an empirical question, there are good reasons for
thinking no corner solution is right.
C. More Is Less: Law Versus Equity
There is one dichotomy that might seem to be of historical inter-
est only or subsumable in some other dichotomy like rules versus stan-
dards—the (in)famous distinction between law and equity.  Although
the fusion of law and equity started long before legal realism and is
not yet wholly complete (mainly because of the right to jury trial at law
and not in equity), legal realism put its characteristic stamp on the
way we think about equity now that it is fused into one system with the
law.91
Some of the early realists realized that rules and standards served
different functions.  Roscoe Pound, for example, thought that
mechanical rules were more important in areas like property and
commercial law but that in areas dealing with personal conduct like
family law and torts no set rule could be devised ex ante.92  The prob-
lem was that Pound did not develop a theory, beyond an intuition
about the broad-brush differences in the interests at stake, that would
have allowed him to differentiate areas of law further or even justify
why one had to take “areas” of law as the unit over which one would
make the decision between rules and standards.  At the same time, he
was quite skeptical of the law and equity distinction that offered an
answer to this question but had no apparent theoretical basis, and
rather developed out of a series of seeming historically path-depen-
dent ad hoc rules and vague principles.93  Pound was not impressed
with equitable maxims as a tool of decision making.94
91 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 1000–02 (1987).
92 Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision III: A Theory of Judicial Decision for Today,
36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923) (“[R]ules of law . . . which are applied mechanically are
more adapted to property and to business transactions; standards where application pro-
ceeds upon intuition are more adapted to human conduct and to the conduct of
enterprises.”).
93 Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 26–27 (1905).
94 Roscoe Pound, On Certain Maxims of Equity, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYS 259, 276–77
(Perry H. Winfield & Arnold D. McNair eds., 1926).
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Other legal realists objected to equity only in that they wished
judges would be more honest and above board about using their dis-
cretion to make policy-based decisions.  But they did not see discre-
tion as something to be contained in the manner of traditional
equity.95  In public law, equity became a convenient hook for large-
scale litigation resulting in structural injunctions to mandate school
desegregation and managing prisons that courts found to violate indi-
viduals’ constitutional rights.96
In private law, the spirit of equity appears in courts’ attention to
context, stringent evaluation under traditional equitable rubrics of
unconscionability, and other similar practices.  Even codifications like
the Uniform Commercial Code are more open-textured and stan-
dards-based than the Uniform Sales Act and the traditional common
law of contract.97
Expanding the equitable approach would be one way to imple-
ment Professor Alexander’s social obligation norm.  But the expan-
sion of equity-style discretion in private law also points to a paradox in
practice.  When equity becomes available everywhere, those who value
stability and certainty will attack it everywhere.98  Thus, one danger of
the “all” prong of the all-or-nothing approach I took issue with in the
previous section is that it calls forth the partisans of “none.”  If “all” or
“none” are the only two choices, some who might have been per-
suaded that some mix of law and equity, of exclusion and social-obli-
gation-inspired governance, would be appropriate will ultimately opt
for “none.”  Or the whole notion of an equitable approach will be
hemmed about in others ways, ultimately weakening it.  This is the
phenomenon of “more is less” identified by Philip Hamburger in the
First Amendment Free Exercise context: a wider application of a prin-
ciple like free exercise can lead to its weakening.99
I turn to applications in the next section, but let me suggest that
some of the Sturm und Drang over Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil100 is an example of more is less. Lucas held that total economic
95 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 78
(Summer 1993); Subrin, supra note 91, at 1000–01. R
96 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 46 (1979).
97 See Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 84, at 618–19, 646–47. R
98 This issue comes up in the dueling opinions in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999).  There the majority opinion by Justice Scalia
holds that federal courts may not issue preliminary injunctions to freeze unrelated assets in
cases in which only money damages are sought because that power did not exist at equity at
the time of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. See id. at 332–33.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
would find such power based on the flexibility and generativity of the equity power. See id.
at 342 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99 Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 837 (2004).
100 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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takings are per se takings unless the regulation prohibits actions that
would have been a nuisance at common law.101  Whether or not total
deprivations of economic value should be per se takings, the so-called
nuisance exception has received a lot of unfavorable attention.102  A
regulation preventing an owner from doing something he did not
have a right to do in the first place is not so controversial.  What is
controversial is deciding on what is and is not part of the owner’s base-
line entitlement, with many like Alexander probably hoping that the
answer is “not much.”  The majority opinion by Justice Scalia largely
identifies the baseline with state nuisance law.103  As the dissents point
out, nuisance is somewhat protean (especially, one might add, in the
Restatement, which Justice Scalia even cites) and has been dynamic over
time.104  Furthermore, nuisance is not everything and seems quite
constrictive (and therefore expansive for owner’s rights) if the idea is
that an owner has the entitlement as part of the default package of
property rights to commit any actions that do not count as a nuisance
at common law.  I have argued elsewhere that nuisance as the most
governance-like part of the law is an understandable first place to look
for a baseline that would be somewhat tailored to particular problems
and yet still be constraining, but a robust theory of how custom is part
of the law can help define the baseline.105  Even nuisance itself con-
tains per se and balancing aspects, despite the emphasis on the latter
in the Restatement and its commentary.106  If this richer picture of nui-
sance and other sources of law, including equity in its domain, were
available, it is at least an open question whether the temptation to
straitjacket the dynamic aspect of the baseline in takings law would be
quite as pronounced as it is.  Fans of rules—a theme of Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence107—will opt for even the straightest of straightjackets
101 See id. at 1031–32.
102 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Back-
ground Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 323, 333–34 &
n.75, 367 (2005) (noting that contextual analysis in nuisance law is in tension with the
categorical approach to takings in Lucas); William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1407 (1993) (“[W]hat is most striking about the holding of Lucas is
that it embeds in the already muddy law of takings . . . the even muddier law of nuisance.”).
103 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031–32.
104 See id. at 1054–55 & n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1068–70 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
105 Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 6,
36–37 (2009).
106 Smith, supra note 35, at 992–93. R
107 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1178–80 (1989).  Caleb Nelson argues that Scalia’s textualism is best seen as a preference
for rules over standards. See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 350
(2005); Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 467 (2005). But
see John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2005) (argu-
ing that originalism is not reducible to a preference for rules over standards). See generally
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Stan-
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when the alternative is leaving everything up for grabs.  In property as
elsewhere, some ex ante decision making about the degree to which we
want to use rules and standards can give the proponents of stability
some assurance at this meta-level so that sweeping super-formalist ap-
proaches are not as attractive.
Although it is far too large a topic for an essay like this one, I
would like to suggest that the use of equity-style decision making, even
in the service of social obligations and human flourishing, runs a simi-
lar danger.  If these principles apply across the board, the tendency
will be to weaken them not only where they are the most difficult to
reconcile with the basic stability of the property system (the “core”)
but more uniformly.  At least in theory, equity allowed a very strong
approach to overreaching and strategic behavior by private parties but
did so in a defined sphere.  Equity acted in personam would not give a
remedy if the law was adequate and relied heavily on how well in-
formed the actors were (in terms of notice and good faith, for exam-
ple).108  Whether these limits worked or not, I would argue that it is
worth asking whether something similar could channel judicial inter-
vention in the name of fairness and morality in order to increase and
concentrate the firepower where it is most needed and where judges
are really the solution rather than part of the problem.
IV
APPLICATIONS
Because I have argued that the compromises involved in the core-
and-periphery, exclusion-and-governance approach to property in-
volve empirical questions, it is worthwhile to consider some of Profes-
sor Alexander’s examples.  Because he eschews any up-front and
across-the-board judgments, it is difficult to evaluate some of his appli-
cations,109 but I will argue that they are better handled under a re-
gime that gives presumptive weight to owners’ exclusion rights and to
traditional legal categories than under his alternative.
At the outset, I take Alexander to be engaged in a mostly norma-
tive exercise.  Otherwise, his characterization of the law is strange.
The risk is a sort of casebook-ism in the approach to law: whatever is
the maximum result in terms of overturning existing categories in
favor of what can be characterized as social obligation forms the new
outer contour of the law—no matter how atypical any of these results
dards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 26–27 (1992) (explaining that politics might drive the distinc-
tion between rules and standards).
108 See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION
§ 2.3(2), at 77, § 2.5, at 123 (2d ed. 1993); SNELL’S EQUITY 86–90, 95, 108–10 (John Mc-
Ghee ed., 31st ed. 2005).
109 Alexander supra note 1, at 776–777, 780–82, 794–96, 800–01, 804–810. R
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may be.  On this view, we have a one-way ratchet to increasing in-
terventionism, with no brakes on the train.  And if nothing is decided
“up front and across the board” and in particular if owners’ exclusion
rights have no presumptive force, one’s imagination is the only limit.
For example, Alexander cites the solar collector case of Prah v.
Maretti110 as an established contour of nuisance law.111  This is far
from being the case. Prah holds that that blocking a solar collector’s
access to sunlight is actionable as a nuisance,112 but it is one of only
two cases that show any openness to this possibility—the rest reject
nuisance liability per se.113  English common law doctrine of “ancient
lights” gave landowners whose windows had unobstructed access to
sunlight for a certain period (generally twenty years)114 a permanent
easement, but this doctrine was firmly rejected in the United States.115
For one thing, it encourages those who would like to acquire an ease-
ment to build faster (less of a problem in a built-up country like En-
gland).116  The facts of Prah itself make one wonder if the owner of
the solar collector built partly to preclude his neighbor’s building
110 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982).  Alexander is not alone in considering the case impor-
tant even though it is quite the outlier.
111 Alexander, supra note 1, at 754. R
112 321 N.W.2d at 191.
113 The other is Tenn v. 889 Associates, Ltd., 500 A.2d 366, 369 (N.H. 1985) (Souter, J.)
(recognizing a nuisance claim for interfering with access to air and light).  The more typi-
cal approach is exemplified by Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So.
2d 357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (denying a legal right to the uninterrupted flow of air
and light from a neighbor’s land); see also WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE
LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.5, at 448 (3d ed. 2000) (citing Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. to show that
courts typically do not recognize necessity easements for light and air).
114 See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 114 So. 2d at 359.
115 The court’s statement in Prah that “American courts have not been as receptive to
protecting a landowner’s access to sunlight as the English courts,” 321 N.W.2d at 188, is
quite the understatement.
116 The concern about racing is closely related to the lack of notice of claims of a
prescriptive easement to light.  See Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65, 69–70 (1877), in which the
court noted:
[T]he owner of open space may not know, and can not know of right, the
internal arrangement of his neighbor’s house; and may “stand by” while the
invading claim, which is finally to embarrass, if not to destroy, the useful-
ness of his land, is gradually accruing against him, until it becomes a vested
right, which he can not dispute.
. . . [I]f he knows that the right is accruing against him, he has no right
of action against the person who enjoys his light or air, to prevent it, be-
cause he has not, and can not have, any exclusive property in the light or
air which occupies his space; he has nothing, therefore, to do, except to
stand by and lose his rights, or erect his obstruction within a given time,
simply for the purpose of protecting what was already his own. . . .
. . . .
. . . No one should stand in danger of unwittingly suffering burdens to
be laid upon his property, nor be constantly compelled to guard against
such an insidious invasion of his rights.
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plans.117  Where such behavioral responses fit into a theory of social
obligation or human flourishing is unclear.  Moreover, the whole class
of “noninvasive” nuisances shares the problem of lack of notice to the
duty holder;118 owners have little clue as to what ex post meritorious
land use their neighbor will come along with that will cut into their
right to build.119  The Prah court’s invocation of protection for bar-
gained-for easements for sunlight and prohibition of spite fences do
not implicate these problems.120  It is also unclear what happens when
solar collectors come into conflict with redwoods trees as has hap-
pened recently in California.121  There a statute favors solar collectors,
but cutting down redwoods seems problematic from an environmen-
tal point of view and led to subsequent non-retroactive legislation pro-
tecting preexisting redwoods that block solar panels.  The traditional
approach of requiring landowners who want an easement protecting
their access to light to negotiate for it ex ante starts looking better and
better no matter what view of flourishing one adopts.
What makes Prah particularly problematic is the rhetoric it uses in
dismissing the traditional approach.  The court treats the presumptive
deference to owners as a relic of the nineteenth century.122  The only
argument the court sees favoring this deference is an outmoded pol-
icy of favoring the development of land.123  This misconceives how
property works and the role of the basic package of owner rights in
furnishing the emergent properties of stability and coordination, with
the court reflexively reaching for a legal realist conception of every-
thing being constantly up for grabs.  Like Alexander, the court sees
the law’s protection of landowners as ready at all times to give way to
regulation, with the increasing importance of sunlight and the de-
creased importance of development (in the court’s view) as justifying
the result.124
Another exhibit in Alexander’s gallery of social-obligation-in-
spired decisions partakes of this pernicious case-by-case ad hocery,
even though, unlike Prah, it reaches the right result.  In State v. Shack,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that aid workers seeking to visit
117 321 N.W.2d at 185 (noting that the owner of the solar collector built his home first
and did not build in the center of the lot).
118 Id. at 199 (Callow, J., dissenting) (noting that the record does not indicate whether
the owner of the solar collector notified the defendant of the circumstances of the collec-
tor before the defendant purchased the property or sought protection for the collector
before the defendant submitted building plans); Smith, supra note 35, at 996–97, 1016–18. R
119 Smith, supra note 35, at 996–97, 1016–18; see also Stein, 56 Ind. at 69–70. R
120 321 N.W.2d at 188–89.
121 Felicity Barringer, In California Neighbors’ Dispute, Officials Find It’s Time to Speak for
the Trees, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A13.
122 Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
123 Id. at 189–91.
124 Id. at 189–90.
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migrant farm workers would not be trespassers if they visited workers
who desired them as visitors, despite the farmer-landowners’ objec-
tions.125  Nevertheless, the court declared that property serves human
ends and came close to saying that it would evaluate all problems in a
largely ex post manner with no presumptive weight for legal categories
of any kind, much less owners’ exclusion rights.126  The court realized
it could have reached a similar result by holding that this was a land-
lord-tenant relationship and that the tenants had a right to receive
guests.127  If need be, this could be taken as a mandatory rule (or a
default rule subject to onerous requirements for contracting
around).128  Perhaps more robust solutions to this problem are for
legislatures, which can amend the trespass statute in the long run.129
Instead, in its most remarkable statement, the court declared that:
We see no profit in trying to decide upon a conventional category
and then forcing the present subject into it.  That approach would
be artificial and distorting.  The quest is for a fair adjustment of the
competing needs of the parties, in the light of the realities of the
relationship between the migrant worker and the operator of the
housing facility.130
This is about as unlike the architecture of property as it can be, in
terms of exclusion and governance, and a numerus clausus of catego-
ries in the interests of third-party information costs.131  Indeed, the
Shack court gives zero weight to the informational and other advan-
tages of legal categories like leases.  When Alexander and others see
State v. Shack as a paradigm of how to decide property cases, they are
advocating removing any presumption in favor of owners’ exclusion
rights.132  It is hard to disagree that the common law has the resources
to make public policy exceptions to trespass and the right to exclude
more generally,133 but the question is how many exceptions to make
125 277 A.2d 369, 374–75 (N.J. 1971).
126 Id. at 372 (“Property rights serve human values.  They are recognized to that end,
and are limited by it.  Title to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of
persons the owner permits to come upon the premises.”).
127 Id. at 373–74.
128 In addition, a court of equity should deny a request for an injunction preventing
such trespasses because of the landlord’s overreaching behavior.
129 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/21-3(c) (West Supp. 2008) (“This Section [of the
criminal trespass statute] does not apply to any person . . . invited by [a] migrant worker or
other person so living on such land to visit him at the place he is so living upon the land.”).
130 Shack, 277 A.2d at 374.
131 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Prop-
erty: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4, 33 (2000).
132 See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 2.3.4, at 39 (2005)
(identifying social need as a justification for intruding onto private property); Pen˜alver,
supra note 3, at 883–84. R
133 SINGER, supra note 132, § 1.3.4, at 39 (“‘Many privileges to intrude upon private R
land exist as a balance between the rights of the occupant to freedom from intrusion and
the needs of society to impose reasonable burdens upon such land for the general wel-
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given the presumption for the right to exclude.  Using a generalized
balancing test where ultimate ends are constantly in view, as the Shack
court claimed it was doing, would be quite a startling innovation.
Again, one suspects that much of what is going on here—in the
courts, not for Alexander—is a matter of rhetorical strategy.  Life goes
on much as it did before, partly because even the New Jersey Supreme
Court does not take this approach literally.  Landowners still do have
some presumptive right, which is indirectly reflected in the New Jersey
courts’ caution in the leafletting cases.  A private university that has a
policy of openness cannot exclude a peaceful leafletter, but a com-
mercial trade school can.134  If the New Jersey Supreme Court has de-
veloped a doctrine that owners who invite others onto their property
cannot reasonably exclude others,135 this has the potential to make
every invocation of the right to exclude a matter of ex post balancing,
except in the case of hermits.136  One wonders how it promotes
human flourishing to mandate that casinos permit access to card
counters unless the casino commission bans them.137  I for one would
fare.’” (quoting Clyde O. Martz, Rights Incident to Possession of Land, in VI-A AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY pt. 20, § 28.10, at 31 (A. James Casner ed., 1954))).
134 Compare State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 630, 633 (N.J. 1980) (holding that a private
university with a policy of open access cannot exclude peaceful leafletters), with State v.
Guice, 621 A.2d 553, 554, 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (holding that a private trade
school without a policy of open access can exclude individuals who intend to distribute
political literature).
135 Schmid comes the closest to articulating a “test” for such a principle, requiring a
court to consider: “(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property,
generally, its ‘normal’ use, (2) the extent and nature of the public’s invitation to use that
property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken upon such property
in relation to both the private and public use of the property.”  423 A.2d at 630; see also
Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060,
1072–73 (N.J. 2007) (quoting and applying the Schmid standard to a common-interest com-
munity and finding no free-speech violation).
136 It is worthwhile to note that New Jersey also defines “public accommodation” very
broadly. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1210, 1218 (N.J. 1999) (describing
the test for public accommodation and finding that the Boy Scouts is a place of public
accommodation), rev’d, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Uston v. Resorts
Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 376 (N.J. 1982).
137 Uston, 445 A.2d at 376.  Nor does the court’s pro-card-counting result gain much
support from the need to combat racial and other invidious discrimination.  Besides being
wildly untailored to fulfill that goal, we have laws that address discrimination more directly.
Nor is the court’s reasoning strengthened by its implication that the right of businesses to
exclude customers has its origins in racial discrimination. Id. at 374 n.4.  The history of the
contours of public accommodations requirements is quite contested, compare A.K. Sando-
val-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in
America, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 62–74 (2005) (arguing that by mid-nineteenth century
the common law imposed special duties to serve only on businesses that served travelers),
with Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1312–31 (1996) (contending that before the Civil War all businesses
open to the public were subject to a duty to serve); see generally MERRILL & SMITH, supra
note 31, at 445–47, but it is quite doubtful that the court (or Alexander) would be willing R
to judge other laws, such as various labor regulations, on the original motivations of their
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allow casino owners to control that little patch of grass.138  Perhaps all
this represents a fine sense of the balance of policy, but I suspect that
the gravitational pull of the core property rights is doing a lot of unac-
knowledged work in cases like this.  It is hard to say, and that is the
problem.
The direct social-obligation theory also countenances some very
dubious results from an environmental point of view.  Alexander buys
into the conventional wisdom too much when he gives hesitating ap-
proval to the decision in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.139  From an ex
post point of view—Alexander’s preferred vantage point—it is true
that an injunction to shut down a polluting factory looks wasteful and
threatening to jobs.   The New York Court of Appeals thus rejected
the rule of almost automatic injunctions in pollution cases in favor of
permanent damages.140  One might think that overcoming exclusion
rights is the theme here rather than human flourishing because in-
junctions or damages are not the only options.  I am at a loss as to why
we have to accept that the plant was correctly located.  Even if ulti-
mately the landowners’ rights to be free from pollution—part of their
default package of rights—have to give way to economic progress and
even if negotiating an easement would involve prohibitive transaction
costs, there is little reason we could not require the cement company
to justify itself to a public authority before building.141  Most statutes
that allow private landowners to exercise a mini–eminent domain for
access to roads or water require them to demonstrate ex ante that ac-
quiring an easement by paying compensation (the liability rule) is in
the public interest.142  Requiring a hearing in the Boomer situation
before the company built the factory, at which the homeowners would
have a right to appear and make the case that there are better sites for
the plant, avoids this ex post dilemma and provides greater protection
proponents. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERI-
CANS, LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL
(2001) (documenting purpose of racial exclusion behind a variety of early labor
regulations).
138 Running a casino, like most things, is harder than it looks. See Lawrence S. Ritter,
On the Fundamental Role of Transactions Costs in Monetary Theory: Two Illustrations from Casino
Gambling, 10 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 522, 524–28 (1978) (economic analysis of trade-
off between speed and losses from lack of change-making in context of casino betting).
139 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); Alexander, supra note 1, at 779–80. R
140 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872–73.
141 Smith, supra note 35, at 1037–45.  Because of its access to raw materials and trans- R
portation on the Hudson River, the general Albany area contained cement plants; Atlantic
Cement built its factory in an unzoned neighborhood filled with small houses and busi-
nesses owned by individuals unlikely to have any political influence.  Daniel A. Farber, The
Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 113, 115 (2005).
142 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9-101, 24-9-103 (2007) (describing conditions and
procedures for applying for a private road, including “[a] specific statement as to why the
land has no legally enforceable access”).
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for both the homeowners’ default package of rights and the human
flourishing it promotes—here rather directly, I might add.  The point
is that there is a wide array of mechanisms to serve the ends of human
flourishing and weakening the residents’ rights need not be done
roughshod as in Boomer.
Alexander happily invokes the public trust and not surprisingly
so.  The public trust makes direct reference to certain interests impor-
tant to the public, although these are traditionally narrow categories
such as navigation and related uses.143  Alexander taps into a recent
line of scholarship and some case law that expands the public trust.144
The interests protected are important, but the public trust does suffer
from great indeterminacy and acts as a sword hanging over landown-
ers, particularly in the context of water rights.145  But Alexander fo-
cuses on beach access.  As is well known, there are multiple
approaches to giving the public rights to access dry sand areas of
beaches, but Alexander likes the public trust and the use to which the
New Jersey Supreme Court (again) put it in the case of Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Association.146  As with historic preservation, it is not
clear why even if public beaches are important to human flourishing
governments shouldn’t be required to compensate owners for taking
them.  The public trust avoids compensation by (re)defining the base-
line of who owns what.147  Alexander invokes the pathbreaking work
of Carol Rose on inherently public property, but Professor Rose her-
self is ambivalent about how far the comedy of the commons—the
idea that some uses are better the more people engage in them—
extends to beaches or whether beachfront landowners should be
compensated.148
Without wading too far into these waters, I would like to raise
some questions as to how Alexander applies the social-obligation the-
ory to this problem.  Why put the burden on beachfront landowners
instead of allowing people to sue localities for local beaches?  Alexan-
143 Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating
Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 702, 706 (2006); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine on Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556
(1970).
144 Alexander, supra note 1, at 802–04. R
145 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 732 (Cal. 1983)
(holding that the public trust doctrine is an appropriate basis for an administrative deci-
sion to allocate water from an “imperiled” mountain lake).
146 471 A.2d 355, 369 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the public trust doctrine establishes an
easement over “quasi-public lands” for public to access beach); Alexander, supra note 1, at R
802–04.
147 See James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 532–34, 565–68 (1989); Klass, supra note 143, at 752–53; Bar- R
ton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1507–08 (1990).
148 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 780–81 (1986).
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der notes how planner Robert Moses built bridges too low to allow
buses from cities to access beaches in order to keep poor people away
from them.149  Why not let plaintiffs sue to enjoin such bridge con-
struction in the future or even to sue now to have Robert Moses’s
bridges torn down?  The bridges would not count as spite fences
under current law because they serve a function other than the exclu-
sionary one, but then why not “expand” this category?  This would
certainly send a message to future discriminatory public authorities.
The bad motive makes them symbols of oppression, and it can be
highly inequitable to allow government’s misfeasance to create obliga-
tions in private landowners (unless they had some special force be-
hind Moses’s building program).  Here as elsewhere we need a more
global view to know about ultimate justice, but courts in a beach ac-
cess case are not the best forum for resolving these questions, unless
we already assume that owners are the ones who always need
whacking.
Returning to the problem of behavioral responses I raised in con-
nection with solar collectors, the incentives of mandating beach access
because of a lack of public beaches can be problematic too.150  Inte-
rior landowners have an incentive to oppose public beaches because
the courts will seize beachfront owners’ property for the missing pub-
lic beaches.  This is perverse.  This is one reason to allow at least com-
pensation, but it also calls into question the specific in-kind quasi-
corrective justice view of the obligations of ownership where it is al-
ways the owner and his seemingly selfish exclusion rights that are the
obstacle to social justice.  Without more of a theory of why this larger
context is irrelevant, it looks as if there is an “up-front and across-the-
board” decision that landowners are always the problem.
Indeed, on the benefits side Alexander seems to slip generally
into an up-front and across-the-board approach.  Why is a public li-
brary an easy case in terms of human flourishing?151  One might say
that it is easy as a “public use,” but why is building a public library
always the best way to promote human flourishing?  Systematic land
reform may well be better than ad hoc, ex post blessing of squatting, as
Alexander suggests,152 but isn’t this an ex ante across-the-board solu-
tion?  Why is the achievement only of social obligation–style benefits
permissible in a sweeping manner?  Why aren’t the benefits of stability
to be achieved that way (especially when there is empirical evidence
149 Alexander, supra note 1, at 805 n.234 (citing Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have R
Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 123–24 (1980)).
150 Alexander, supra note 1, at 804. R
151 Id. at 781–82.
152 Id. at 790–91.
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that some package of stable property rights is beneficial)?153 Ex ante
delegation to owners with a (rebuttable) presumption in favor of per-
mitting them to exclude outsiders is part of the infrastructure for
human flourishing and so should benefit from the preference for
sweeping benefits (if there is one).
Alexander seems to have in mind a different corner of the takings
jurisprudence in the background: the rate-setting cases.154  At various
points in his article, he says that it is all right to override the owners’
rights because they are getting a reasonable rate of return.155  This is a
regulated-industries approach, and given the nightmarish quality of
the rate-setting problem with its valuations and definitions of cost, it is
hard to see why this should become a general model for ownership.156
In an interconnected world, as opposed to a single industry character-
ized by natural monopoly, these rate-setting questions would balloon
in number and difficulty (and would be about the least modular way
imaginable to solve the problem).  Indeed, falling into a rate-setting
regulated industries vision is one of the least attractive and least realis-
tic aspects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central.157
Generalizing it would lead to all the problems of opportunism and
uncertainty that I argue would bedevil the large-scale use of liability
rules in property law.158
CONCLUSION
Alexander’s theory is another chapter in the long history of legal
realism.  He is right that much of law and economics is too one di-
mensional at the level of ends.  But he does not carry the critique far
enough.  Like legal realism and law and economics, his theory is too
homogeneous in not distinguishing enough between ends and means.
The structure of property in terms of a core and periphery, or exclu-
sion and governance, is no accident and constitutes no denial of his
153 See, e.g., Acemoglu et al., supra note 63, at 1395 (concluding that European colonial R
settlements with secure property-rights systems developed stronger economies than settle-
ments with extractive institutional arrangements); Simon Johnson et al., Property Rights and
Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1335, 1354 (2002) (finding, based on a study of post-communist
nations, that lesser property rights protections cause firms to reinvest in the market at a
lower rate); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 523 (2001) (presenting findings suggesting that common law coun-
tries experience higher growth than civil law countries through greater security of contract
and property rights).
154 See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989) (holding that
a Pennsylvania law preventing electricity providers from setting utility rates to reflect invest-
ments in as-yet-unused plant did not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
155 See ,e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 794–95. R
156 See Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 314 (“The economic judgments required in
rate proceedings are often hopelessly complex . . . .”).
157 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 121 n.23, 136 (1978).
158 Smith, supra note 43, Part III. R
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persuasive case that the ends property law serves are plural and can be
fruitfully thought of in terms of human flourishing.  But when it
comes to the gap between these ultimate ends and some of property’s
means for getting there, we have to be open to the possibility that
sometimes ends are best pursued indirectly.
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